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Abstract
This paper presents a monoidal category whose morphisms are games
(in the sense of game theory, not game semantics) and an associated
diagrammatic language. The two basic operations of a monoidal category,
namely categorical composition and tensor product, correspond roughly
to sequential and simultaneous composition of games. This leads to a
compositional theory in which we can reason about properties of games in
terms of corresponding properties of the component parts. In particular,
we give a definition of Nash equilibrium which is recursive on the causal
structure of the game.
The key technical idea in this paper is the use of continuation pass-
ing style for reasoning about the future consequences of players’ choices,
closely based on applications of selection functions in game theory. Ad-
ditionally, the clean categorical foundation gives many opportunities for
generalisation, for example to learning agents.
1 Introduction
This paper presents a monoidal category whose morphisms are games (in the
sense of game theory, not game semantics) and an associated diagrammatic lan-
guage. The two basic operations of a monoidal category, namely categorical
composition and tensor product, correspond roughly to sequential and simul-
taneous composition of games. This leads to a compositional theory in which
we can reason about properties of games in terms of corresponding properties
of the component parts. In particular, we give a definition of Nash equilibrium
which is recursive on the causal structure of the game.
The context of this paper begins with [19], which for the first time ap-
proached game theory using ideas from program semantics. Many ideas used
in this paper first appear there, such as the idea that a game should be a ‘pro-
cess’ mapping observations to choices, and the use of monads (or equivalently
premonoidal categories) to model game-theoretic side effects such as probabilis-
tic choice. Nevertheless, the game theory developed in that paper is no more
compositional than ordinary game theory.
Giving a compositional theory of games is far from straightforward. The
main objects of study in this paper are so-called pregames, which can be thought
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of as games relative to a continuation. The use of continuation passing style in
game theory is implicit in the literature on selection functions (see [8] for an
introduction), and was recently made explicit by the author in an (unpublished)
extended abstract [13]. Pregames are also closely related to the ‘partially de-
fined games’ of [17]. Broadly speaking, when a player computes which move to
play, she does so with knowledge about how that move is going to be used by
the environment (consisting of the rules of the game and the other players) to
compute an outcome. If we take this intuition seriously and relativise an entire
game to a continuation, including the equilibrium condition, it becomes possible
to develop a compositional theory of games.
The use of string diagrams as an internal language for monoidal categories
has been developed in quantum information theory [4] and bialgebra [10], and
also applied in linguistics [6]. A string diagram denotes a morphism of a
monoidal category, and the connection is made formal by a coherence theo-
rem saying that the morphism denoted by a string diagram is invariant under
certain topological moves of the diagram. There are many variants of monoidal
categories, each with its own associated string language, surveyed in [22]. The
language used in this paper is the one for symmetric monoidal categories (sec-
tion 3.5 of loc. cit.), extended with an operation called teleological unit, which
is unique to game theory and developed in this paper.
Our string diagrams appear to be related to influence diagrams, an existing
graphical language applied mostly in decision theory but also in game the-
ory [15]. Although the precise relationship is still to be worked out, string
diagrams appear to be preferable because their well-understood categorical se-
mantics (symmetric monoidal categories) allows them to be easily generalised
beyond ordinary probabilistic choices.
The notation used in this paper is intentionally reminiscent of the notation
used in linear algebra, quantum theory and linguistics. The categories appear-
ing in those areas have additional structure (namely, a compact closed or dagger
structure) which gives a ‘quantum causality’ in which information can appear
to flow both forwards and backwards in time. Although we do not have this
structure, the teleological unit appears very similar to the unit of a compact
structure, and in particular satisfies a coherence theorem very similar to nat-
urality of the unit. The game-theoretic interpretation of this is that we have
a limited form of backward-causality due to rational agents reasoning about
future values.
Outline Section 2 defines pregames, the objects of study of this paper, defines
the various categorical operations on them, and introduces the string diagram
language. Section 3 proves the coherence theorems necessary for the string
language to be well-defined. Section 4 details the relationship between pregames
and selection functions, on which they are based. Finally section 5 gives several
directions for applications and theoretical research.
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Conventions In this paper we work only with pure strategies, to simplify
the proofs in section 3. This amounts to defining our constructions starting
from the category of sets, but all of the theory in this paper works for an
arbitrary symmetric monoidal category, of which the most obvious to use is the
category of stochastic relations [11]. Other possibilities, including generalising
to premonoidal categories, are discussed in section 5.
We will equate sets up to natural isomorphism, which simplifies our notation
in several places. The unique element of the terminal set 1 will be denoted •,
in order to avoid overuse of the symbol ∗ which denotes duality. We also have
deleting and copying functions ! : X → 1, ∆ : X → X ×X .
A relation R ⊆ A×B will be denoted R : A 7−→ B, as is usual in the string
diagrams literature (for example in [19]).
2 The category of pregames
Definition 1. Let X, Y , R and S be sets. A pregame G : X ⊗ S∗ → Y ⊗ R∗
consists of the following data:
• A set ΣG of strategy profiles
• A play function PG : ΣG → Y
X
• A coplay function CG : ΣG → S
X×R
• An individual rationality relation1 EG : ΣG 7−→ X ×R
Y
Formally we will have a category whose objects are pairs of sets, and G will
be a morphism (X,S)→ (Y,R). We will suggestively write this as G : X⊗S∗ →
Y ⊗ R∗, as though we had a compact category. Since we do not, this is only
syntactic shorthand. We extend this notation in obvious ways, for example
writing A ⊗ B∗ ⊗ C∗ ⊗ D for (A × D,B × C). We will draw G using string
diagram notation as
G
S
R
X
Y
The most interesting part of the definition of a game is the type X × RY .
1The term ‘individually rational’ is used in economics, in particular in mechanism design,
where it is an example of a rationality condition that is both ‘individual’ or ‘local’ (applies to
each player individually rather than a group), and is qualitative rather than quantitative.
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A pair (x, k) : X ×RY will be called a context, where x is the history2 and k is
the continuation. The continuation represents ‘closing the loop’ between Y and
R, with arbitrary future computation done by the environment collapsed into
a single function. The composition and tensor product of pregames operate by
taking an existing continuation and extending it both forwards and backwards
in time, as is usual when programming with delimited continuations.
Also notice the curious similarity between the types of the play/coplay func-
tions and the witnesses used in the Dialectica interpretation of intuitionistic
implication [3]. Because of this, there is a strong resemblance between parts
of the proof of theorem 1 and parts of the soundness proof for the Dialectica
interpretation.
Definition 2. A closed pregame is a pregame of the form G : S∗ → Y , with
X = R = 1. In this case we have X × RY = 1, and so EG is a unary relation
on strategy profiles ΣG . If σ : ΣG is a strategy profile for a closed pregame G we
will call σ an equilibrium of G iff σEG•.
In a string diagram, the identity object of a category is denoted by empty
space. Therefore a closed pregame is of the form
G
S
Y
We will build pregames, using categorical composition and tensor product,
from three atomic components: decisions, computations and the teleological
unit3. Broadly, the first two divide a game into players (or agents) and rules.
The teleological unit is used to model the backward-causality present in game
theory caused by players reasoning about future events.
Definition 3. A decision is a pregame G : X → Y ⊗ R∗ satisfying ΣG = Y
X
and PGσ = σ.
2The generalisation beyond the category of sets is not completely obvious here: for a game
with side-effects modelled by a monad M on a locally small category the set of contexts should
be hom(1,MX)× hom(Y,MR). That is, the ‘history’ is not a concrete history, but an object
representing the computation of a history. For example if we have mixed strategies then we
need a probability distribution over possible histories.
3Teleology is the form of causality due to agents ‘striving’ to reach some future aim. The
use of this name here is intended to highlight that this operation alone accounts for a large
difference between physics and game theory.
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Graphically, a decision is of the form
G
X
R Y
To specify a decision is to specify an individual rationality relation EG :
Y X 7−→ X × RY . As for selection functions, this relation can encode a large
amount of information about a player’s preferences and personality. The intu-
ition is that the decision G represents an agent who observes the value at X
and makes a choice at Y , while reasoning forwards in time about the outcome
at R. The relation σEG(x, k) should hold iff the agent has no incentive to uni-
laterally deviate from the strategy σ, in the context in which the history is x
and the outcome resulting from the choice y is ky. For example, for a classical
utility-maximising agent we have R = R and
σEG(x, k) ⇐⇒ k(σx) = max
y:Y
ky
More generally, in section 4 we show how to design such relations using multi-
valued selection functions or quantifiers.
Definition 4. Let f : X → Y be a set-theoretic function. We can view f as a
pregame either covariantly as f : X → Y , or contravariantly as f∗ : Y ∗ → X∗.
In both cases we have Σ = 1, and define •E(x, k) to be true for every x and k. In
the covariant case we set Pf• = f , and in the contravariant case we set Cf∗• = f
(or, adding an explicit type isomorphism for readability, Cf∗•(•, x) = fx).
Covariant and contravariant computations are respectively drawn as
f
X
Y
f
Y
X
A particularly important example of a computation is the copying compu-
tation ∆X : X → X ⊗X . This allows us to use a value more than once, and
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will be drawn
X
Definition 5. Let G : X ⊗ T ∗ → Y ⊗ S∗ and H : Y ⊗ S∗ → Z → R∗ be
pregames. The composition H ◦ G : X ⊗ T ∗ → Z ⊗R∗ is defined by
• ΣH◦G = ΣG × ΣH
• PH◦G(σ1, σ2) = PHσ2 ◦ PGσ1
• CH◦G(σ1, σ2)(x, r) = CGσ1(x,CHσ2(PGσ1x, r))
• (σ1, σ2)EH◦G(x, k) iff σ1EG(x, k
′) and σ2EH(PGσ1x, k), where
k′y = CHσ2(y, k(PHσ2y))
Definition 6. Let G : X1 ⊗ R
∗
1 → Y1 ⊗ S
∗
1 and H : X2 ⊗ S
∗
2 → Y2 ⊗ R
∗
2 be
pregames. The monoidal product
G ⊗H : X1 ⊗ S
∗
1 ⊗X2 ⊗ S
∗
2 → Y1 ⊗R
∗
1 ⊗ Y2 ⊗R
∗
2
is defined by
• ΣG⊗H = ΣG × ΣH
• PG⊗H(σ1, σ2)(x1, x2) = (PGσ1x1,PHσ2x2)
• CG⊗H(σ1, σ2)((x1, x2), (r1, r2)) = (CGσ1(x1, r1),CHσ2(x2, r2))
• (σ1, σ2)EG⊗H((x1, x2), k) iff σ1EG(x1, k1) and σ2EH(x2, k2) where
k1y1 = (pi1 ◦ k)(y1,PHσ2x2)
k2y2 = (pi2 ◦ k)(PGσ1x1, y2)
Composition and tensor product are graphically represented, as usual, by
end-to-end and side-by-side juxtaposition.
Definition 7. Teleological unit is the pregame τX : X ⊗ X
∗ → 1 given by
ΣτX = 1, CτX • (x, •) = x and with •EτX (x, •) holding for all x.
6
We graphically represent the teleological unit by a cup
This notation is usually used for the unit of a compact structure, which comes
with a dual cap representing the counit, satisfying the intuitive ‘yanking equa-
tion’. Although we do not have a cap, the notation is justified by theorem
3.
3 Coherence theorems
Theorem 1. There is a category Pregame whose objects are pairs of sets
(X,R), written X ⊗ R∗, and whose morphisms are pregames. The identity
morphism on X ⊗ R∗ is idX⊗R∗ = idX ⊗ id
∗
R, and the composition is the one
given in the previous section.
Proof. We begin by noting that the identity pregame is explicitly given by
• ΣidX⊗R∗ = 1
• PidX⊗R∗ • = idX
• CidX⊗R∗•(x, r) = r
• •EidX⊗R∗k for every k
(Note that idX⊗R∗ is really an endomorphism of (X × 1, 1 × R), but we are
equating sets up to natural isomorphism.)
Left identity Let G : X ⊗ S∗ → Y ⊗R∗. We prove that idY⊗R∗ ◦G = G. We
have
• ΣidY ⊗R∗ ◦G = ΣidY ⊗R∗ × ΣG = 1× ΣG = ΣG
• PidY ⊗R∗ ◦Gσ = PidY ⊗R∗• ◦ PGσ = idY ◦PGσ = PGσ
• CidY ⊗R∗ ◦Gσ(x, r) = CGσ(x,CidY ⊗R∗ • (PGσx, r)) = CGσ(x, r)
• σEidY ⊗R∗ ◦G(x, k) ⇐⇒ σEG(x, k
′) ∧ σEidY ⊗R∗ (PGσx, k) ⇐⇒ σEG(x, k
′)
where
k′y = CidY ⊗R∗ • (y, k(PidY ⊗R∗ • y)) = ky
Right identity We prove that G ◦ idX⊗S∗ = G. We have
• ΣG◦idX⊗S∗ = ΣG × ΣidX⊗S∗ = ΣG × 1 = ΣG
• PG◦idY ⊗R∗σ = PGσ ◦ PidX⊗S∗• = PGσ ◦ idX = PGσ
• CG◦idY ⊗R∗σ(x, r) = CidX⊗S∗ • (x,CGσ(PidX⊗S∗ • x, r)) = CGσ(x, r)
• σEG◦idY ⊗R∗ (x, k) ⇐⇒ •EidX⊗S∗ (x, k
′)∧σEG(PidX⊗S∗•x, k) ⇐⇒ σEG(x, k)
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Associativity Let G : X ⊗ U∗ → Y ⊗ T ∗, H : Y ⊗ T ∗ → Z ⊗ S∗ and
I : Z ⊗ S∗ →W ⊗R∗. We have
Σ(I◦H)◦G = ΣG × ΣI◦H = ΣG × ΣH × ΣI = ΣH◦G × ΣI = ΣI◦(H◦G)
For the play function we have
P(I◦H)◦G(σ1, σ2, σ3) = PI◦H(σ2, σ3) ◦ PGσ1
= PIσ3 ◦ PHσ2 ◦ PGσ1
= PIσ3 ◦ PH◦G(σ1, σ2)
= PI◦(H◦G)(σ1, σ2, σ3)
and for the coplay function have
C(I◦H)◦G(σ1, σ2, σ3)(x, r) = CGσ1(x,CI◦H(σ2, σ3)(PGσ1x, r))
= CGσ1(x,CHσ2(PGσ1x,CIσ3(PHσ2(PGσ1x), r)))
= CGσ1(x,CHσ2(PGσ1x,CIσ3(PH◦G(σ1, σ2)x, r)))
= CH◦G(σ1, σ2)(x,CIσ3(PH◦G(σ1, σ2)x, r))
= CI◦(H◦G)(σ1, σ2, σ3)(x, r)
For the equilibrium condition we have
(σ1, σ2, σ3)E(I◦H)◦G(x, k3)
⇐⇒ σ1EG(x, k1) ∧ (σ2, σ3)EI◦H(PGσ1x, k3)
⇐⇒ σ1EG(x, k1) ∧ σ2EH(PGσ1x, k2) ∧ σ3EI(PHσ2(PGσ1x), k3)
⇐⇒ (σ1, σ2)EG◦H(x, k2) ∧ σ3EI(PH◦G(σ1, σ2)x, k3)
⇐⇒ (σ1, σ2, σ3)EI◦(H◦G)(x, k3)
where
k2z = CI(z, k3(PIσ3z))
k1y = CI◦H(σ2, σ3)(y, k3(PI◦H(σ2, σ3)x))
= CI◦H(σ2, σ3)(y, k3(PIσ3(PHσ2x)))
= CHσ2(y,CIσ3(PHσ2y, k3(PIσ3(PHσ2x))))
= CHσ2(y, k2(PHσ2x))
Theorem 2. The category Pregame is symmetric monoidal, with unit 1⊗ 1∗,
and the tensor product given in the previous section.
Proof. We must prove the existence in Pregame of natural isomorphisms λX :
I ⊗ X → X , ρX : X ⊗ I → X , αX,Y,Z : (X ⊗ Y ) ⊗ Z → X ⊗ (Y ⊗ Z) and
σX,Y : X⊗Y → Y ⊗X making certain diagrams commute. Since we are treating
sets up to natural isomorphism we can take each of these to be the identity, and
the diagrams all commute automatically.
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Theorem 3. If f : X → Y is a computation then τY ◦(f⊗id
∗
Y ) = τX◦(idX ⊗f
∗).
In diagrams,
f = f
Proof. Firstly note that we have
Pf⊗id∗
Y
• x = fx Cf⊗id∗
Y
• (x, y) = y
PidX ⊗f∗ • x = x CidX ⊗f∗ • (x, x
′) = fx′
We have ΣτY ◦(f⊗id∗Y ) = 1 = ΣτX◦(idX ⊗f∗). For the play function,
PτY ◦(f⊗id∗Y )
•x = PτY •(Pf⊗id∗Y •x) = • = PτX •(PidX ⊗f∗ •x) = PτX◦(idX ⊗f∗)•x
and for the coplay function,
CτY ◦(f⊗id∗Y )
• (x, •) = Cf⊗id∗
Y
• (x,CτY • (Pf⊗id∗Y • x, •))
= CτY • (Pf⊗id∗Y • x, •)
= Pf⊗id∗
Y
• x
= fx
= f(PidX ⊗f∗ • x)
= f(CτX • (PidX ⊗f∗ • x, x))
= CidX ⊗f∗(x,CτX • (PidX ⊗f∗ • x, •))
= CτX◦(idX ⊗f∗) • (x, •)
Finally for both cases we have •E(x, •) for all x.
4 Relationship to selection functions
In this section we show that pregames subsume certain classes of ‘higher-order
games’. Firstly we consider the ‘context-dependent games’ of [14], which provide
a large generalisation of simultaneous games with pure strategies. Secondly we
consider finite generalised sequential games in the sense of [8], which provide a
large generalisation of extensive-form games of perfect information. In each case
we will focus on two-players games for simplicity. We can also easily generalise
to mixed strategies, which is described in section 5.
A two-player context-dependent game is defined in [14] to consist of the
following data:
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• Sets X , Y of choices for each player, and R of outcomes
• Multivalued selection functions ε : (X → R)→ PX , δ : (Y → R)→ PY
• An outcome function q : X × Y → R
A strategy profile is simply a pair (σ1, σ2) : X × Y . A strategy profile is called
a selection equilibrium if
σ1 ∈ ελx.q(x, σ2)
σ2 ∈ δλy.q(σ1, y)
Theorem 4. The selection equilibria of this game are precisely the equilibria of
the string diagram
q
P1 P2
X Y
R R
where
σ1EP1(•, k) ⇐⇒ σ1 ∈ εk
σ2EP2 (•, k) ⇐⇒ σ2 ∈ δk
Proof. Algebraically, this string diagram is
τR ◦ (q ⊗∆
∗
R) ◦ (P1 ⊗ P2)
Unwinding the definitions, we have
(σ1, σ2)EτR◦(q⊗∆∗R)◦(P1⊗P2)(•, •)
⇐⇒ (σ1, σ2)EP1⊗P2(•, k) ∧ •EτR◦(q⊗∆∗R)(PP1⊗P2(σ1, σ2)•, •)
⇐⇒ (σ1, σ2)EP1⊗P2(•, k)
⇐⇒ σ1EP1 (•, k1) ∧ σ2EP2(•, k2)
⇐⇒ σ1 ∈ εk1 ∧ σ2 ∈ δk2
where
k(x, y) = CτR◦(q⊗∆∗R) • ((x, y), •)
= Cq⊗∆∗
R
• ((x, y),CτR • (Pq⊗∆∗R • (x, y), •))
= Cq⊗∆∗
R
• ((x, y),CτR • (q(x, y), •))
= Cq⊗∆∗
R
• ((x, y), q(x, y))
= ∆R(q(x, y))
= (q(x, y), q(x, y))
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k1x = (pi1 ◦ k)(x,PP2σ2•) = (pi1 ◦ k)(x, σ2) = q(x, σ2)
k2y = (pi2 ◦ k)(PP1σ1•, y) = (pi2 ◦ k)(σ1, y) = q(σ1, y)
A two-player sequential game is defined in [8] to consist of the following data:
• Sets X , Y of choices for each player, and R of outcomes
• Multivalued quantifiers ϕ : (X → R)→ PR, ψ : (Y → R)→ PR
• An outcome function q : X × Y → R
A strategy profile for this game consists of a move σ1 : X for the first player
and a contingent strategy σ2 : X → Y for the second player. A strategy profile
is called optimal if
q(σ1, σ2σ1) ∈ ϕλx.q(x, σ2x)
q(x, σ2x) ∈ δλy.q(x, y) for all x : X
(Note that the difference between selection functions and quantifiers is relatively
unimportant: we could equally well define simultaneous games using quantifiers,
and sequential games using selection functions.)
Theorem 5. An optimal strategy profile for this game is an equilibrium of the
string diagram
P1
P2
q
R
R
X
Y
where
σ1EP1(•, k1) ⇐⇒ k1σ1 ∈ ϕk1
σ2EP2(x, k2) ⇐⇒ k2(σ2x) ∈ ψk2
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Proof. Algebraically this string diagram is
τR ◦ (q ⊗∆
∗
R) ◦ (((idX ⊗P2) ◦∆X)⊗ id
∗
R) ◦ P1
Unwinding the definition, we have
(σ1, σ2)EτR◦(q⊗∆∗R)◦(((idX ⊗P2)◦∆X)⊗id∗R)◦P1(•, •)
⇐⇒ (σ1, σ2)E(((idX ⊗P2)◦∆X)⊗id∗R)◦P1(•, k1)
⇐⇒ σ1EP1(•, k2) ∧ σ2E((idX ⊗P2)◦∆X)⊗id∗R(PP1σ1•, k1)
⇐⇒ σ1EP1(•, k2) ∧ σ2E(idX ⊗P2)◦∆X (σ1, k3)
⇐⇒ σ1EP1(•, k2) ∧ σ2EidX ⊗P2(P∆X • σ1, k3)
⇐⇒ σ1EP1(•, k2) ∧ σ2EP2(σ1, k4)
⇐⇒ q(σ1, σ2σ1) ∈ ϕλx.q(x, σ2x) ∧ q(σ1, σ2σ1) ∈ ψλy.q(σ1, y)
where
k1(x, y) = (q(x, y), q(x, y))
k2x = C((idX ⊗P2)◦∆X)⊗id∗Rσ2(x, k1(P((idX ⊗P2)◦∆X)⊗id∗Rσ2x))
= (pi2 ◦ k1)(P((idX ⊗P2)◦∆X)⊗id∗Rσ2x)
= (pi2 ◦ k1)(P(idX ⊗P2)◦∆Xσ2x)
= (pi2 ◦ k1)(PidX ⊗P2σ2(x, x))
= (pi2 ◦ k1)(PidX • x,PP2σ2x)
= (pi2 ◦ k1)(x, σ2x)
= q(x, σ2x)
k3(x, y) = (pi1 ◦ k1)(x, y)
= q(x, y)
k4y = k3(PidX • σ1, y)
= q(σ1, y)
The converse does not hold, because the definition of optimal strategy pro-
file generalises subgame-perfect equilibria, which is an equilibrium refinement of
Nash [9]. The definitions given in this paper generalise easily to subgame-perfect
equilibria, but we do not do this because subgame-perfection, unlike Nash, is
not decidable in general.
5 Future directions
The potential applications of a compositional, graphical game theory are nu-
merous, especially in economics, and this paper also raises some interesting
theoretical questions. We conclude by broadly giving some future research di-
rections and questions, most of which are being explored by the author together
with the other authors of [14].
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• Possibly the most important theoretical concepts missing from this paper
are repeated games and incomplete information games, both of which are
ubiquitous in economic applications. This is work in progress.
• Another important aspect of game theory that cannot be modelled in this
way is the ability for the ‘shape’ of a subgame to depend on a previous
move, for example with the ‘moves of nature’ used in the usual approach to
incomplete information. The obvious approach to this is to use dependent
types, which leads immediately into current research on type systems. A
complication is that mechanical type inference has already proven invalu-
able in practice.
• A promising approach to the semantics of the teleological unit is a strong
resemblance to shift/reset operators for programming with delimited con-
tinuations [7, 1]: a decision is analogous to the shift operator in that it
captures a continuation, and the teleological unit is analogous to the reset
operator in that it delimits a continuation.
• Due to the difficulty of reasoning with continuations, computer support is
vital for all but the most trivial applications. The author has developed a
Haskell implementation, but it is extremely awkward to use because the
Haskell type system does not unify types like X ∼ 1×X and X ∼ 1→ X ,
and so the user must manually keep track of these isomorphisms. As an
intermediate step, a code generator for a domain specific language simi-
lar to Haskell’s arrows [18] would be useful. (Unfortunately, for technical
reasons it does not seem to be possible to use GHC’s built-in arrow pre-
processor.) Ultimately a graphical interface would be invaluable for these
ideas to become accessible to working economists.
• As a by-product of obtaining a compositional theory, we have the ability
to model preferences of agents which are extremely different to utility
maximisation or preference relations. This extends a line of work begun
in [14], which uses fixpoint selection functions to model coordination and
differentiation. Obvious next steps include modelling bounded rationality
[21] and social concerns.
• A potentially very powerful dimension is to vary the underlying category,
as discussed in the introduction. The use of ordinary (possibilistic) non-
determinism in game theory is explored for example in [19, 5, 12] and [16,
chapter 9], and work in progress by the author suggests that the order
structure on possibilistic strategies is important. We also have experi-
mental evidence that correlated equilibria [2] appear as a special case by
using a commutative monad transformer stack in which a reader monad
gives players read-only access to a shared randomising device.
• Using noncommutative side-effects is potentially even more rewarding,
but there is theoretical work to be done on graphical languages for Freyd
categories. A major aim is to use strategies with mutable states to model
13
learning, and individual rationality relations to specify that a strategy can
be subjectively rational with respect to current epistemic knowledge, for
example using methods of epistemic game theory [20].
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